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ABSTRACT 
THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY: 
A STUDY AND CRITIQUE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN HICK 
John K. Dryden, Jr. 
Director: Osborne P. Wiggins 
July 31, 2003 
This thesis is a study and critique ofJohn Hick's pluralistic hypothesis as 
presented in his book An Interpretation oj Religion. I primarily focus on two issues: 
Hick's epistemology of religious beliefs and the pluralistic hypothesis itself. These are 
two separate issues, but for Hick they prove to be inextricably linked. Hick uses his 
epistemological stance to argue that there is an epistemological problem of religious 
diversity. After he argues that there is a problem, he presents his solution, i.e. the 
pluralistic hypothesis. After explaining these issues, my critique focuses upon the 
connection between the two. I first critique Hick's epistemological stance and in so 
doing argue that his hypothesis is unwarranted. I then argue that even if Hick's 
epistemological position is correct, the problem of religious diversity is much broader 
than Hick presents it and his hypothesis is much too limited in scope to adequately deal 
with the problem. 
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Introduction 
Currently in the philosophy of religion, a debate over the problem of 
religious plurality continues among many philosophers. John Hick, a leading 
philosopher of religion who deals with this issue, cites the problem in the 
following way: 
... the most viable defence of religious belief has to be a defence of the 
rationality of basing beliefs ... on religious experience. From the point of 
view of a Christian philosopher - as distinguished from a philosopher 
simply as such - there is, however, an obvious challenge to this in the fact 
that the same epistemological principle establishes the rationality of Jews, 
Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists etc. in holding beliefs that are at least partly, 
and sometimes quite radically, incompatible with the Christian belief-
system.1 
According to Hick, the traditional Christian assumption that Christianity is the 'one 
true religion' undermines Christian philosophers' efforts to rationalize religious 
belief by grounding it in religious experience. For " ... if only one of the many 
belief-systems based upon religious experience can be true, it follows that 
religious experience generally produces false beliefs, and that it is thus a 
generally unreliable basis for belief formation.,,2 We shall see that Hick argues 
that you can either hold the view that there is only one true religion, or the view 
that that religious experience justifies religious beliefs, but not both, for these are 
contradictory positions. 
I John Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Palgrave, 2001) 25. 
2 Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion 26. 
The purpose of this paper is to fully explicate and take a stance on the 
debate of religious pluralism. I will do this by using the works of Hick, primarily 
An Interpretation of Religion, as my focal and entry point into the debate. In 
explicating the views of Hick, I will concentrate on two issues which for Hick are 
inextricably linked. The first issue concerns the justification of religious beliefs 
based upon religious experience; the second is Hick's pluralistic hypothesis. 
These are certainly two separate issues, but for Hick, the first gives rise to the 
second. Hick basically claims that the fact that religious beliefs are justified by 
religious experience creates a problem, the problem of religious diversity. Hick's 
solution to this problem is his pluralistic hypothesis. 
After explaining Hick's position on the issue of the rationality of religious 
beliefs and his pluralistic hypothesis, I will then present critiques of Hick's work 
by other leading philosophers of religion. Last, I will reexamine the issue of the 
justification of religious beliefs and argue that Hick's pluralistic hypothesis is 
unwarranted. I will advocate the position of religious falliblism; that is, the 
position that religious beliefs are inherently uncertain and possibly mistaken. 
will support Hick's claim that it is rational to trust our experience, even if it is 
religious experience, but argue that this does not lend itself to his version of 
pluralism. It does, however, suggest that religious beliefs (among other types of 
beliefs) should be accompanied with the realization that they could very well be 
mistaken. Moreover, this position of religious fallibilism will help us "move 
beyond the static situation of rival absolutisms."3 




The Dialogue: An Introduction to the Problem of Religious Diversity 
In Hick's book Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, is a dialogue 
between Hick and William Alston that nicely presents the problem of religious 
diversity. Before explaining this dialogue, let me first cover some basic 
presuppositions of Hick's argument for the problem of religious diversity. A 
central premise to Hick's argument is that the justification of religious belief must 
be grounded in religious experience. Hick distinguishes between two types of 
religious experience. "In the one kind the 'information' is mediated through our 
material environment: things, events and processes in the world are experienced 
as having a religious character or meaning in virtue of which they manifest to us 
the presence of the transcendent".4 This first kind of religious experience is 
common both to the ordinary believer and to the great prophets and leaders of 
the various traditions. They occur in various forms and levels of intensity. This 
experience can take the form of "the sense ... of one's life as being lived in the 
presence of God; the consciousness of ordinary life as avidya (illusion) and of all 
4 John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (New Haven: Yale UP, 1989) 154. 
3 
things as sunya (empty)".5 More generally it is "the whole experience of persons 
in so far as they are religious.,,6 
Distinguished from this type of religious experience is mystical experience, 
which Hick defines as: 
those forms of religious experience that express the presence of the Real, 
not as manifested in our material environment, but as directly affecting the 
human psyche. These are experiences in which the 'information' being 
presented to consciousness has been received by some kind of extra-
sensory awareness of our ultimate environment.7 
This mystical experience can take the form of the unitive experience of the 
oneness of God/Absolute etc. or the communitive experience of 
visions/auditions.8 
Hick's premise that religious beliefs are justified via these types of 
religious experience is critical to his argument for the problem of religious 
diversity and will prove central in the dialogue with Alston. Prior to Pascal, most 
philosophers tried to argue for the rationality of religious belief by making 
arguments for the existence of God. Pascal took a different approach, arguing 
that it is a greater risk not to believe in God than it is to believe in God.9 While 
Hick does not take this approach, he agrees with Pascal that "the justification of 
theistic belief does not consist in an argument moving directly to the conclusion 
that God exists but rather in an argument for the rationality of so believing 
despite the fact that this cannot be proved or shown to be in any objective sense 
5 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 154. 
6 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 154. 
7 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 165. 
8 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 165. 
9 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 211. 
4 
more probable than not.,,10 Natural theology and classical philosophy of religion 
has tried to show that theistic religious belief is rational by proving the existence 
of God. If God's existence could be proven, it would of course be rational to 
believe in God's existence. But this project has failed according to Hick, so he 
takes this alternative approach. 
For Hick, the impossibility of proving the existence of God is similar to the 
impossibility of proving the existence of the external world. 11 While we cannot 
prove the external world's existence, it is rational, and even necessary, for us to 
trust our experience. "That is to say, we are so constituted that we cannot help 
believing and living in terms of the objective reality of the perceived world.,,12 The 
same is true for religious experience. Those who vividly experience their lives in 
relation to a transcendent reality are behaving rationally when they trust this 
experience and believe that this reality exists. In fact, such persons would be 
irrational not to trust this experience. 
Initially, John Hick has mahatmas, or people at the origin of the great 
religions, in mind for people who experience a transcendent reality in this clear 
and vivid manner. He uses the specific example of Jesus who "was vividly aware 
of 'living in the unseen presence of God' as abba, father. God, as personal 
loving will, was as real to him as his neighbours or as the hills and rivers and lake 
of Galilee. The heavenly father was not a mere concept or a hypothetical entity, 
but an experienced living reality ... ,,13 
10 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 2 J 1. 
ii Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 213. 
i2 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 213. 
13 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 216. 
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After arguing for the rationality of religious belief of mahatmas based upon 
their vivid religious experience, Hick then proceeds to answer the obvious 
question concerning the religious beliefs of the ordinary person. While their 
beliefs can never be as grounded as the beliefs of the great mahatmas, if "one 
experiences one's own life religiously, even only occasionally and to some slight 
extent, this makes it both possible and reasonable to be so impress~d by the 
reports of the mahatmas that one's own experience is supported by their much 
more massive awareness of the transcendent.,,14 So, for Hick, the rationality of 
religious belief is always grounded in experience, whether it is the vivid 
experience of the great religious leaders, or the less vivid experience of the 
common person which then relates to the accounts of the mahatmas. 
In the dialogue with William Alston, Hick argues that the central premise 
that religious belief is justified only by religious experience undermines the 
position that there is at most one true religion. The central issue in this dialogue 
concerns the epistemology of religious beliefs. Hick begins to describe this 
problem by pointing out that most contemporary philosophers of religion are in 
agreement that "the most viable defence of religious belief has to be a defence of 
the rationality of basing beliefs ... on religious experience." 15 This defense of 
religious belief, however, poses problems for the Christian philosopher because 
the epistemological stance applies not just to Christianity, but to the other world 
religions as well. Thus, "the same epistemological principle establishes the 
rationality of Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhist etc. in holding beliefs that are at 
14 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 223. 
15 Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion 25. 
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least partly, and sometimes quite radically, incompatible with the Christian belief-
system.,,16 
Hick cites Alston's proposed solution to the problem of religious diversity 
as presented in his work Perceiving God: "Alston's solution to the problem is (in 
briefest summary) that since we have at present no neutral way of establishing 
which of the world religions is right, and since our own religion is both 
theoretically and practically satisfactory to us, it is much more reasonable for us 
to stay with it than to switch to another.,,17 Hick's critique hinges upon what he 
takes as an assumption in Alston's position, namely that there can at most be 
one true religion. Hick points out that the proposition 1) 'religious belief is rational 
because it is based upon religious experience' and the proposition 2) 'there is at 
most one true religion' are contradictory. "For if only one of the many belief 
systems based upon religious experience can be true, it follows that religious 
experience generally produces false beliefs, and that it is thus a generally 
unreliable basis for belief-formation.,,18 
Hick maintains that this contradiction is so strong that Alston's position is 
unable, without 'radical adjustment' to "meet the challenge of religious diversity to 
his experience based apologetic.,,19 Hick then alludes to his own position by 
claiming that Alston's first proposition seems correct, but that it would be a "much 
16 Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion 25. 
17 Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion 25. 
18 Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion 26. 
19 Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion 27. 
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stronger contribution if the doxastic practices of the other world religions could be 
seen as further instances of it rather than as contradicting it.,,20 
Alston's original response is very brief, but he answers Hick's critique in 
two ways. According to Alston, Hick's position that the assumption of one true 
religion necessitates that religious experience generally produces false belief, 
and is therefore unreliable, is misleading. "First, it assumes that most of the 
beliefs in each system contradict most of the beliefs in the others. But that is by 
no means clear, and in the absence of any definite way of counting, it could not 
be clear.,,21 Second, Alston claims that Hick misrepresents his view by inflating 
the role that religious experience has in justifying religious beliefs. Alston 
maintains that while religious experience is important for grounding religious 
beliefs, it also interacts with other grounds such as natural theology and 
revelation.22 "Thus, even if the major religious belief systems are mostly in 
contradiction, there is still the question of the extent to which this is to be laid at 
the door of religious experience.,,23 
Alston additionally points out that even if the beliefs grounded in religious 
experience were false, that would not contradict the epistemological claims he 
makes for religious experience.24 Here, Alston claims that religious beliefs based 
upon religious experience are only prima facie justified; that is, they can be 
20 Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion 27. 
21 William Alston, "Section 2(i)(b)," Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, cd. John Hick (New York: 
Palgrave, 200 I) 37. 
22 Alston, 37. 
23 Alston, 37. 
24 Alston, 38. 
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overridden by other factors. He does not explain this position thoroughly until his 
second response. 
In the next section, Hick responds to each of Alston's points in direct 
fashion. Concerning Alston's first point that it is not clear that most of the beliefs 
in each system contradict most of the beliefs in the other, Hick answers that while 
this is true, his argument only requires that the central beliefs contra~ict one 
another, which can hardly be denied to be the case. "So I do not think that 
Alston's first response deflects the criticism that it is intended to deflect. He has 
pointed out, correctly, that his position does not apply to al/ religious beliefs, but it 
still does apply to the most central ones.,,25 Hick also grants that Alston's 
position in his book Perceiving God does include that other factors, such as 
natural theology and revelation, are at play in grounding religious belief in 
rationality, creating a 'mutual evidential network'. But this does not alleviate the 
problem of religious diversity. Even if one were to grant that these other factors 
are involved, each of the great world religions would still be "epistemically equally 
well based, supported by religious experience, supposed revelation, revered 
scripture, inspiring role models and a more general uplifting effect in people's 
lives; and natural theologies that would exclude the non-theistic faiths by 
providing a personal Creator, do not succeed in doing SO.,,26 
The last section of the dialogue is a fuller response from Alston to the 
criticism of Hick. He notes that there are two assumptions that he must hold in 
order for Hick's criticism to be valid. The first is that there is a good amount of 
25 Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion 40. 
26 Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion 41. 
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incompatibility between the beliefs of the world religions. The second is that, of 
these incompatible beliefs, a good amount of them are grounded in religious 
experience, or as Alston states "mystical perception". 
What Hick needs for his criticism is merely that I accept these 
assumptions. And this is how his premise that I hold that 'Christianity is 
the only fully true religion' comes into the argument. For, as noted above, 
he derives from this that I am thereby committed to holding that 'religious 
experience within other religions produces beliefs that are false in so far 
as they are incompatible with Christian belief'. But it is very important to 
note that this consequence need not be so derived.27 
So, the rest of this response is dedicated to the task of showing that it is not 
religious experience in and of itself that produces false beliefs. 
Alston states that he is "prepared to acknowledge that ... there is a 
considerable degree of incompatibility between central beliefs of different 
religions,,28, but that is detrimental to his argument only if the incompatibilities 
result from mystical perception-based beliefs. However, mystical perception 
mainly produces 'manifestation' beliefs, or "beliefs as to what perceivable 
features God has and as to what He is doing vis-a-vis the subject.,,29 These 
manifestation beliefs, however, are not the source of incompatibilities between 
the major religions. Incompatible beliefs between the world religions have to do 
with "the central beliefs about the Ultimate, its (his, her) nature, general activities, 
purposes, etc., rather than how it is related to this or that individual, or what its 
perceivable features are.,,30 
27 Alston, 43. 
28 Alston, 44. 
29 Alston, 44. 
30 Alston, 45. 
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Alston attempts to further his defense by introducing the notion of an 
'overridder system' which was only touched upon in his first response. "Religious 
experience can provide significant justification for religious beliefs only if it is set 
in the context of an 'overridder system' for assessing the credentials of any 
particular belief based on that experience.,,31 An overridder system basically just 
consists of the central beliefs of a particular religion, so that each religion can be 
said to be an overridder system from which mystical experience-based beliefs 
can be judged. But if the system itself is faulty, it will incorrectly assess the 
beliefs. "Thus, if a considerable proportion of the beliefs of a religion are false, 
mystical perception within that religion cannot be relied on to produce mostly true 
beliefs, since the overridder system employed, containing many false beliefs, 
cannot be depended on to separate the wheat from the chaff.,,32 
John Hick does not respond to this response, and the dialogue ends here. 
But it is easy to anticipate how Hick might respond. First of all, by introducing the 
notion of the overridder system, Alston has shifted the power of justification of 
religious beliefs from religious experience to the overridder system, or the religion 
itself. Hick notes in his original critique of Alston that Alston maintains that "the 
most viable defence of religious belief has to be a defence of the rationality of 
basing beliefs (with many qualifying provisos which Alston has carefully set forth) 
on religious experience.,,33 (emphasis added) But these many qualifying provisos 
diminish the importance of religious experience in rationalizing religious beliefs. 
Alston's position seems to be that religious experience rationalizes religious 
31 Alston, 45. 
32 Alston, 45. 
33 Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion 25. 
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beliefs, but only if they are in line with a satisfactory system, or, in other words, a 
true religion. But Alston himself admits that he gives no criteria for which to 
judge the various overridder systems. Alston recognizes that his case for 
religious experience must form a part of a cumulative case for Christianity: "the 
final stage of my programme was missing. I shied away from any attempt 
critically to evaluate the Christian belief system in general.,,34 While Alston 
believes that the defense of Christianity on neutral grounds "can be given some 
substance,,35, he admits that this has not yet been done. Hick is correct in 
maintaining that until this is done, the problem of religious pluralism seems to 
remain for the exclusivist. 
This dialogue serves as a good introduction into the problem of religious 
pluralism for a number of reasons. First, it begins to highlight the three main 
positions: exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. Exclusivism maintains that 
there is only one true religion and that adherence to that one true religion is the 
only way to achieve the only religious end. The inclusivist also maintains that 
there is only one fully true religion, but also holds the belief that people of other 
religions can achieve salvation. For instance, the Christian inclusivist claims that 
Christianity is the only true religion, but the grace of God and the power of Christ 
are sufficient to include adherents of other religions. Finally, the pluralist believes 
that there is no one true religion. Rather, all of the major religions are on equal 
footing in their relation to the transcendent. 
34 Alston, 48. 
35 Alston, 38. 
12 
This dialogue also serves as a good introduction because through the 
method of critique, Hick is able to argue why there is a need for his positive work, 
his pluralistic hypothesis. Ultimately, I contend that Hick and Alston are at an 
impasse which is caused by their fundamentally different views on the 
importance of religious experience. We have seen how Alston's qualifying 
provisos diminished the importance of religious experience in his philosophy. But 
for Hick, religious experience proves central for establishing the rationality of 
religious belief, and is, consequently, fundamental to his hypothesis. 
As was shown in this dialogue, anyone who holds the position that 
religious experience is what grounds religious belief in rationality invites the 
problem of religious pluralism. "For if the different kinds of religious experience 
justify people in holding incompatible sets of beliefs developed within the different 
traditions, has not our justification for religious belief thereby undermined 
itself?,,36 If we accept Hick's argument of the rationality of religious beliefs, we 
seem to be faced with this problem. In an attempt to solve this problem, Hick 
posits his hypothesis. 
! : 
36 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 228. 
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Chapter 2 
Explanation of Hick's Pluralistic Hypothesis 
In the briefest way, Hick's pluralistic hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
"The great post-axial faiths constitute different ways of experiencing, conceiving 
and living in relation to an ultimate divine Reality which transcends all our varied 
versions of it.,,37 To flesh this out, Hick begins by making a distinction between 
'the Real' [the transcendent divine reality] an sich and 'the Real' as humanly 
experienced by different people. The Real' an sich is 'the Real' as it is 
independent of people's experiences of it. It is 'the Real' in itself, as it is unable 
to be perceived. Distinguished from 'the Real' an sich is 'the Real' as it is 
humanly experienced. This is not 'the Real' as it is in itself, but 'the Real' as it 
appears to human consciousness. Moreover, this appearance to human 
consciousness occurs in myriad ways. The Real' appears to different people in 
different cultural and historical contexts in different ways. This then accounts for 
the plurality of religious traditions. 
In order to fully understand the second half of Hick's distinction, one must 
first understand his views on experience, or as he calls it, 'experience-as'. Hick 
argues that we never just passively experience any object, but always 
experience objects as something. That is, we always bring a certain background 
37 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 235-6. 
14 
and certain theories to experience. He borrows this idea from Wittgenstein, but 
expands it to cover more area than Wittgenstein intended. Wittgenstein wrote 
about ambiguous picture puzzles, in which the picture could be seen in one of 
two ways. For instance, the picture may be seen as a young French woman 
looking to the right or, conversely, as an old witch looking to the left. Given the 
ambiguity, Wittgenstein pointed out that we have to see the picture as one or the 
other, so we just don't see the picture. 
Whereas Wittgenstein limited this 'seeing-as' to the puzzle picture, Hick 
contends that all seeing is seeing-as and even all experience is experience-as. 
To show this, Hick uses the example of seeing a fork on the table. The fork is so 
familiar an object that it seems strange to say that we are seeing the object on 
the table as a fork. "However we have more usual names for ordinary seeing-as 
in real life: we call it 'recognising' or 'identifying.",38 Even in the everyday 
occurrence of seeing a fork, we are seeing it as a utensil for eating. However, 
the only reason why we see the fork as a utensil for eating is because we bring to 
this experience a certain background. We come from a culture, time, and place 
where objects of this type are used for eating, so we see them as such. 
However, someone from a very different culture might not see the fork as 
a tool for food consumption. Depending on their background, they may see it as 
a piece of decorative art, a hair comb, or an object to be feared and worshipped. 
I I 
"But they would not have the concept of a fork with which to identify it as a fork. 
38 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 141. 
15 
Indeed to say that they do not have this concept and that they cannot perform the 
act of recognition are two ways of saying the same thing.,,39 
For Hick, experiencing-as, or more specifically seeing-as, is to apply a 
linguistic concept to an object being perceived. This process of concept applying 
is something humans do automatically when they focus upon objects. I cannot 
look outside my window and see a chimney without applying the concept of 
chimney to it; I automatically see it as having a certain use and function. This 
concept is created by the linguistic environment of which I am a part. ''These 
conceptual creations are the inner skeletons structuring the various forms of life, 
or ways of being human, that constitute the different cultures of the earth.,,4o 
The notion of experience-as is crucial to understanding the second half of 
the distinction of 'the Real', that is 'the Real' as humanly experienced. For this 
notion of experience-as not only applies to forks and picture puzzles, but also to 
human experiences of the Real. When someone experiences the Real, they 
automatically apply their linguistic concepts to it. The way they experience the 
Real is shaped by their language, culture and history; it is shaped by their 'way of 
being human'. 
Given that there are multiple ways of being human and that the Real is 
always experienced through this lens, the fact of religious pluralism begins to be 
explained. On this hypothesis, while the Real an sich is what all of the great 
religions are related to, multiplicity occurs not because all religion is illusion and 
imagination, nor because one religion is right while others are deluded or 
39 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 141. 
40 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 142. 
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incomplete, but because all experience of the Real is 'experience-as'. Just as 
seeing the picture puzzle as a young French woman is just as valid as seeing it 
as the old witch, so each of the great religions are equally valid experiences of 
the Real. 
There is also a limiting nature to the notion of experience-as. By seeing 
the fork as a utensil for food consumption, I have limited my experience of it to 
that concept. I am therefore unable, at the same time, to experience it as a piece 
of decorative art or an object to be feared and worshipped. Likewise, the 
experience of the Real as a personal deity, as in Jewish experience, is limited to 
that concept. If I experience the Real as a personal deity, I am unable, at the 
same time, to experience it as a non-personal absolute common in Buddhist 
experience. So while all of the major religions are equally valid ways of 
experiencing the Real, they are all also limited and incomplete. 
In developing his hypothesis, Hick draws heavily upon the philosophy of 
Kant. He does not draw upon Kant's epistemology of religion, but upon his 
understanding of sense perception, which is then expanded by Hick to formulate 
his own epistemology of religion. In examining sense perception, Kant noticed 
that the same object could be perceived differently by different people. This led 
him to distinguish between the world an sich, as it is itself, unperceived and the 
world as perceived by finite minds. He used the term 'noumenon' to refer to the 
I I 
former and the term 'phenomenon' for the latter. 
Hick expands Kant's insight of sense perception to cover religious 
experience. Kant showed that we sense perceive objects, which gives rise to us 
17 
postulating the objects' noumenal existence. Hick claims that we religiously 
experience the Real which gives rise to the postulation of the Real as it is itself. 
It is important, however, to note that the 'noumenon' for Kant is not knowable by 
any human faculty and the phenomenon has empirical reality. "Analogously, 
[Hick wants] to say that the noumenal Real is experienced and thought by 
different human mentalities.,,41 These different experiences are "not illusory but 
are empirically, that is experientially, real as authentic manifestations of the 
Real.,,42 So, it seems that it might be dangerous to view this as a 
Reality/appearance distinction because the term appearance suggests a lack of 
reality. For Hick, a phenomenon of the Real has empirical reality, just as the 
phenomenon of the chimney outside my window has empirical reality. 
Before moving on to see how this hypothesis plays out, there are a couple 
of obvious questions, upon which certain critiques of Hick are based, which Hick 
addresses. First of all, why does Hick maintain that each of the traditions is 
experiencing the same transcendent? Could it not be the case that for each 
religion the noumenon behind the phenomenon is different and distinct? To 
answer this, Hick appeals to Ockham's razor. "The 'truthfulness' of each tradition 
is shown by its soteriological effectiveness. But what the traditions severally 
regard as ultimates are different and therefore cannot all be truly ultimate. They 
can however be different manifestations of the truly Ultimate within different 
streams of human thought-and-experiences - hence the postulation of the Real 
41 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 242. 
42 Hick, An Intelpretation of Religion 242. 
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an sieh as the simplest way of accounting for the data.,,43 Secondly, why 
postulate the Real an sieh at all? "The answer is that the divine noumenon is a 
necessary postulate of the pluralistic religious life of humanity.,,44 He argues that 
if the Real an sieh is not postulated then one must take either the position that 
religious experience is illusory or the position that the only religious experience 
that is not illusory is one that comes from one particular tradition or stream of 
thought. "But for those to whom neither of these options seems realistic the 
pluralistic affirmation becomes inevitable, and with it the postulation of the Real 
an sieh, which is variously experienced and thought as the range of divine 
phenomena described by the history of religion.,,45 
To further develop his hypothesis, Hick turns toward the task of showing 
how this hypothesis has played itself out in the history of religion. He notices two 
main ways in which the Real has been experienced, as personae and as 
impersonae. Concerning the personae, Hick shows that all of the major religious 
traditions have thought of the transcendent reality in personal terms. This, of 
course, is obvious in the Semitic traditions, but Hick shows that it is not limited to 
them. For example, in Mahayana Buddhism, "Buddha has been elevated, not 
merely by popular imagination but by religious reflection, from the greatest of 
human teachers to a being of universal power and significance" and "is referred 
to in the Lotus Sutra as Devatideva, supreme god of the gods.,,46 Even the 
adherents of the more philosophical traditions, such as Taoism and 
43 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 248-9. 
44 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 249. 
45 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 249. 
46 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 256. 
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Confucianism, "seem to have needed to think of the transcendent as a personal 
reality or realities, able to be approached by means of ritual, prayer and 
sacrifice.,,47 
After Hick demonstrates the pervasiveness of personal deities in the major 
world religions, which according to his hypothesis would be the pervasiveness of 
the Real being experienced in a variety of personal ways, he then turns to the 
task of examining these experiences phenomenologically. 
Given that there is this almost universal propensity of the human mind to 
think-and-experience the presence of the Real in personal terms, what is 
the status and nature, from the point of view of our pluralistic hypothesis, 
of the numerous gods, goddesses and mono-deities? As an approach to 
this question we shall do well first to take note of their phenomenological 
character.48 
Hick distinguishes between experiences of the Real and philosophical or 
theological reflections of the Real; or as Pascal labeled the distinction, "between 
the God 'of the philosophers and scholars' and the 'God of Abraham, God of 
Isaac, God of Jacob.",49 He notes that the experienced personae of the Real are 
never experienced as infinite. Infinity is a concept that exceeds experience and, 
according to Hick, has been attributed to God through the second order business 
of philosophy and theology, not through religious experience.5o In Jewish 
experience certain qualities of God, such as goodness or justness, may be 
experienced as unending in the sense that they extend beyond the experiential 
horizons of the one who experiences God, but this is not an experience of infinity. 
"But the point [Hick wants] to stress is that the experienced divine personae are 
47 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 257. 
48 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 257. 
49 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 258. 
50 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 259. 
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not phenomenologically infinite, although - according to our hypothesis - they 
are manifestations within finite human experience of the Real which, being truly 
ultimate, has no limits.,,51 
Hick develops his concept of divine personae by way of analogy with the 
psychological concept of personae. He writes that a person is made up of 
character and personality. 'The character is the underlying and only slowly 
changing ground-plan which the personality expresses, whilst the personality is 
the conscious surface [or public 'face'] which lives in interaction with other 
selves.,,52 The character of a person is analogous to the Real an sich and the 
personality of a person is analogous to the various divine personae taken as a 
whole. A persona of a person is "a role that one builds within a certain group,,53 
and a particular persona of a person is, of course, analogous to a particular 
persona of the Real, otherwise known as a deity. 
According to our hypothesis the Real is always present to human life, with 
our capacity for religious awareness; and in its theistic forms that 
presence consists in various divine personae who are known in different 
streams of religious history. Each of these has an experienced social 
reality and power within the life of the worshipping community in relation to 
which it has been formed, and it constitutes the Real as perceived and 
responded to by that community.54 
Hick admits that this analogy is not perfect, for it is not a greater self that is 
behind the various divine personae, but simply the ultimate ground beyond 
human conception. But it does serve as a nice model that clarifies and develops 
the pluralistic hypothesis. 
51 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 263-4. 
52 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 264. 
53 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 265. 
54 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 266. 
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The question of the ontological status of these various divine personae 
remains for Hick to answer. In an attempt to do this, Hick suggests two possible 
models, the Christian doctrine of the trinity and the Buddhist trikaya doctrine, and 
ultimately contends that the latter is the best model for the present purposes. 
According to this doctrine, there are three modes of the infinite Buddha-natur~. 
Hick concerns himself primarily with the second mode, the Sambhogakaya, 
which is "the 'Body of Bliss', consisting in a plurality of transcendent Buddhas.,,55 
The ontological status of this 'Body of Bliss' has been traditionally understood in 
two ways. The first way sees the body as mental creations that become so vivid 
that they acquire a subjective reality. 
To clarify this, Hick compares it to the parapsychological concept of 
'veridical hallucinations'. This occurs when one person is made telepathically 
aware of another person's death via a vision of that person. "The experience is 
technically hallucinatory in that there is no physical body in the region of space 
which the apparition seems to occupy .... But it is a veridical hallucination in that 
through it authentic information about B is being transmitted to A.,,56 If 
understood in this way, the experienced divine persona (while not usually 
experienced visually) has no objective reality, but it does "constitute a 
transformation of authentic information of which the Real is the ultimate 
source.,,57 Given that the source of the persona is the Real, it would still be 
appropriate to worship this persona. For whether or not the worshipper realized 
55 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 272. 
56 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 273. 
57 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 273. 
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its subjectiveness, the persona would still be a means of mediating the 
relationship between herself and the Real.58 
In Buddhist tradition, the Sambhogakaya has also been understood to 
have objective reality so that the transcendent Buddhas are objectively existing, 
supernatural beings.59 "Applying this conception to Jahweh, Vishnu, Allah, 
Shiva, the heavenly Father and so on it would follow that they are real personal 
beings, independent centres of consciousness, will, thought and emotion.,,6o If 
this is correct it must be remembered that these personal beings are not infinite, 
"for each exists alongside and is limited by the others with their particular natures 
and capacities.,,61 Ultimately, Hick does not answer the question of the 
ontological status of the personal phenomenon of the Real. He states that "the 
pluralistic hypothesis being propounded here could accommodate either of these 
models and does not require a decision between them. It therefore seems wise 
not to insist upon settling a difficult issue which, in logic, the hypothesis itself 
leaves open.,,62 
After developing his hypothesis by explaining the concept of the personae 
of the Real, Hick then extends his hypothesis to include what he calls the 
Impersonae of the Real. From the point of view of the pluralistic hypothesis, 
Impersonae are manifestations of the Real as non-personal, religious Absolutes. 
Hick deals specifically with the Hindu absolute of Brahman and the Buddhist 
i I 
absolute of NirvanaiSunyata. Concerning Brahman, he distinguishes between 
58 Hick, All Interpretation of Religion 273. 
59 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 274. 
60 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 274. 
61 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 275. 
62 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 275. 
23 
nirguna Brahman and saguna Brahman. ''The highest reality, containing no 
element of illusion, is nirguna Brahman, Brahman without attributes, beyond the 
scope of human thought and imagination. Less high, because involving some 
element of illusion, is saguna Brahman, Brahman with attributes, known as 
Ishwara, the personal creator and lord of the universe.,,63 Hick then further 
distinguishes satchitananda, which Brahman is also often called. This, however, 
is not a deity like sag una Brahman, but a mystical state of being, pure 
consciousness and bliss. Given that nirguna Brahman is completely ineffable, 
beyond all human concepts, Hick cites it as being equal to the Real an sich while 
saguna and satchitananda Brahman are different phenomenal manifestations of 
the Real. "In offering this proposal from the standpoint of the pluralistic 
hypothesis I am treating the trans-personal reality of satchitananda . .. and the 
personal Reality of Ishwara ... as alternative manifestations of the Real to our 
human consciousness. Thus in this formulation the Real an sich is equated with 
nirguna Brahman, whilst both satchitananda and Ishwara are identified forms of 
saguna Brahman.,,64 
When considering Buddhism and its relation to the pluralistic hypothesis, 
Hick concentrates on two concepts: Nirvana and Sunyata. These two concepts 
are central to two different branches of Buddhism, Theravada and Mahayana 
Buddhism respectively. For Theravada Buddhism, Nirvana is the mystical 
experience achieved when liberation from bondage to the ego occurs. "From the 
point of view of our pluralistic hypothesis Nirvana is the Real experienced in an 
63 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 280. 
64 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 282-3. 
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ineffable ego-Iessness, unlimited and eternal, which can be entered by the moral 
and spiritual path taught by Buddha.,,65 According to the hypothesis, the 
Mahayana experience of Sunyata is also an experience of the Real, not as it is in 
itself, but through a particular cultural lens. 
The Mahayana tradition claims that Sunyata is an unmediated experience 
of the Absolute, but Hick concludes by arguing that this is in all probability not the 
case. 
However does not the fact that there are a number of different traditions of 
unitive mysticism, offering their characteristically different reports of the 
nature of the Real, make it seem more likely that the otherwise universal 
structure of human consciousness holds here also, and that that which is 
being directly experienced is not the Real an sich but the Real manifested 
respectively as Sunyata, as Brahman, as God?66 
For Hick, the data of multiple but different and seemingly incompatible claims to 
unitive experience with the Ultimate Reality suggests that even in highly mystical 
experiences, the mind still "operates with culturally specific concepts and that 
what is experienced is accordingly a manifestation of the Real rather than the 
postulated Real an sich.,,67 
Thus far, we have seen through the Hick! Alston debate why Hick 
maintains that there is a problem of religious diversity that needs to be 
addressed. I have explained Hick's solution to this problem, which is his 
pluralistic hypothesis. I have further shown the way this hypothesis has played 
itself out in the history of religion. I will now turn my attention to various critiques 
I 
of Hick's hypothesis before giving my own critique and response. 
65 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 287. 
66 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 294. 




One type of critique that will be presented concerns Hick's overall 
empiricist position, specifically in his argument for the meaningfulness of religious 
language, and how this position relates to his hypothesis. Before presenting 
these critiques, I will first cover what this basic empiricist position entails for Hick 
and how he uses it to argue for religious meaningfulness. 
Beginning in the 1920's, the philosophical movement of logical positivism, 
which was associated with empiricism, argued for the 'verifiability criterion of 
meaning'. This is the notion that in order for a proposition to be cognitively 
meaningful, it must be able to be verified through observation. Given that God's 
existence is unable to be verified through observation, religious propositions 
were excluded and deemed cognitively meaningless. 
Hick claims that while the logical positivist movement is a thing of the past, 
some of their central insights are not a thing of the past and need to be 
addressed presently. In his paper "Eschatological Verification Reconsidered" 
(1977), Hick writes that "the central core of the positivist contention seems 
undeniable. For it is simply the basic empiricist position that to exist, or to be the 
case, is to make a difference. That is to say, to assert that x exists is to assert an 
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in-principle-observable difference between the actual universe and a possible 
universe which differs from it only in that the latter does not include X.,,68 Hick 
notes that the assumption of the logical positivist that this in-principle-observable 
difference must be of the kind detected in sense data was simply 'an a priori 
dogma,.69 However, despite this positivist dogma, "it is a perfectly good question 
to ask one who asserts that God exists, or that a divine purpose is being fulfilled 
in human life, what in-principle-experienceable difference it makes whether God 
exists or whether a divine purpose is being fulfilled in human life.,,70 
What, then, counts as an experienceable difference? To answer this, Hick 
distinguishes between simple and complex verifiability. The truth values of 
certain statements are able to be verified by simple observation. These include 
statements like ''There is a table in the next room". One can simply look into the 
next room, see the table, and thus verify the truth of the statement. Other 
propositions (ex. "John Smith is an honest man") require cumulative 
observations. Theistic statements, along with most scientific theories, belong to 
this second variety. "This distinction between simple and complex verifiability 
enables us to avoid a wrong approach to the question of the verification of 
theistic statements. We should not ask, what single observation would verify 
them, but what development of our experience would progressively confirm them 
to the point at which there is no longer any room for rational doubt? .,,71 
68 John Hick, "Eschatological Verification Reconsidered," Religious Studies 13 (1977): 192. 
69 Hick, "Eschatological Verification Reconsidered" 192. 
70 Hick, "Eschatological Verification Reconsidered" 192. 
71 Hick, "Eschatological Verification Reconsidered" 194. 
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Thus, according to Hick, the verifiability of the claims of the particular 
theistic traditions consists not in a direct observation of God, but "in experiencing 
features of the universe, as it changes through time, which trace the difference 
that the existence of God makes. These constitute the fulfillment of the divine 
purpose for creation.,,72 Accordingly, if the claims of Islam or of Christianity are 
true, we will be able to verify this in the eschaton, when our awareness of God 
will "no longer be in tension with the circumstances of sin and suffering, ugliness 
and deprivation, which at present leave room for rational doubt.,,73 
In his article entitled ''The Pluralistic Hypothesis, Realism, and Post-
Eschatology", S. Mark Heim gives an internal critique of John Hick's work An 
Interpretation of Religion. He criticizes Hick on a number of fronts. He argues 
that two of Hick's arguments, the argument for religious meaningfulness and the 
justification of religious belief, do not support his pluralistic hypothesis. 
Moreover, he argues that these two arguments, taken together, "raise serious 
questions about whether Hick's hypothesis actually succeeds in asserting a 
meaningful truth claim.,,74 
Heim summarizes Hick's argument for religious meaningfulness and 
mentions Hick's contention that "religious convictions and faith are meaningful 
and have cognitive content precisely because there are conditions under which 
evidence sufficient for determination of their truth or falsehood will obtain.,,75 Hick 
argues that religious content is meaningful because there is a situation in which 
72 Hick, An interpretation of Religion 178. 
73 Hick, "Eschatological Verification Reconsidered" 196. 
74 Mark S. Heim, "The Pluralistic Hypothesis, Realism, and Post-Eschatology," Religious Studies 28 
(1992): 207. 
75 Heim, 211. 
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the claims of a particular religion can be verified. While they cannot be verified 
currently, eschatological verification makes religious claims meaningful. 
Heim turns this argument around on Hick. He claims that if possible 
verification is what makes claims meaningful, then there are serious doubts. as to 
whether claims of the pluralistic hypothesis are meaningful. 
However, the sole religiously significant content which Hick allots to the 
religious traditions - that there is a noumenal ultimate Real impinging 
upon us, in relation with which humans are transformed by reality-
centeredness toward a limitlessly better possibility - must itself be subject 
to eschatological verification to be meaningful and true. If not, then Hicks 
tenacious argument for a realistic verses a non-realistic view of religion 
has the ironic effect of vindicating the truth value of the particular religious 
traditions but denying it to his own pluralistic hypothesis.76 
Heim then asks the obvious question. What possible situation would confirm 
that there is a noumenal Real behind all of the great religions in relation to which 
the religious are being transformed to a 'limitlessly better possibility'. 
Heim maintains that the pluralistic hypothesis, as stated by Hick, is in 
principle unverifiable even under eschatological circumstances for two reasons. 
"First, it is hard to see how any experience of fulfillment could constitute 
verification of a 'limitlessly better possibility,.,,77 Even if a post-mortem or 
eschatological experience surpassed all of our hopes, how could we ever know it 
to be limitlessly better? 
Secondly, and more importantly, "whatever experience of beatitude might 
be encountered in such a condition, the assertion that it is a single noumenal 
'Real' which is the source of this experience is just what could not be verified.,,78 
76 Heim, 211. 
77 Heim, 212. 
78 Heim, 212. 
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Heim argues this point by showing that Hick's notion of experience ('experience 
as') would still apply eschatologically and prevent one from experiencing the Real 
an sieh, or, in other words, experience the Real as it is unable to be experienced. 
Hiem points out that Hick might object that any eschatological fulfillment or 
combination of eschatological fulfillments is compatible with his hypothesis. But 
Heim argues that, while this is true, it is just a further suggestion that the 
hypothesis is empty.79 Even if the eschaton were experienced by a Christian as 
conforming exactly or very closely to what the Christian belief system says to 
expect, this also would be compatible with Hick's hypothesis. But it by no means 
verifies it, for this experience would also be compatible with the Christian 
exclusivist position. ''The fact of the matter is that any such fulfillment would be 
powerful evidence for the cognitive validity of that specific religious tradition or 
combination of traditions and their accounts of themselves, in preference to 
Hick's account. There would be nothing at all distinctively confirmatory of Hick's 
hypothesis in such a situation, since his hypothesis asserts something over and 
above the specific traditions."so 
Heim's main critique thus far seems to be as follows: Hick holds the 
position that in order for a proposition to be meaningful it must have the 
possibility of being verified through experience. It is evident that Hick holds this 
position; otherwise he would not feel the need to appeal to eschatological 
verification in his argument for religious meaningfulness. However, Hick's idea of 
the noumenal "Real" is the Real as it is unable to be experienced. If the 
79 Heim, 213. 
so Heim, 213. 
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noumenal "Real" is unable to be experienced, it seems that this condition would 
also apply in the eschaton. Therefore, Hick's propositions concerning the 
noumenal "Real", even those propositions simply asserting its existence, are 
meaningless. Therefore, while arguing for the meaningfulness of the language of 
particular religions, he has denied meaningfulness to his pluralistic hypothesis. 
After Heim uses Hick's argument for religious meaningfulness against his 
pluralistic hypothesis, he does the same with Hick's argument for the justification 
of religious belief. Heim states that Hick is unwarranted to move from the fact 
that beliefs from different traditions are equally justified to the hypothesis that 
there is one noumenal object behind all their views. "This hardly follows. The 
thought just outlined leans heavily on the implicit suggestion that equally justified 
beliefs ought in some sense to be equally true (or false)."s1 
At this point of the critique, however, Heim is guilty of misrepresenting 
Hick's argument. Hick is not claiming that there is a logical connection between 
the fact that there are different, seeming incompatible, justified religious beliefs 
and his pluralistic hypothesis. His hypothesis is just that, a hypothesis. It is a 
position tentatively assumed and its successfulness will be determined by how 
well it makes sense of certain facts and experiences. It is not meant to be 
something deduced from facts. 
However, Heim continues to the strongest part of the critique when he 
argues that Hick's hypothesis is completely irieffective precisely because it is 
compatible with every possible state of affairs and that it is impossible to either 
verify it or falsify it. To argue this, Heim again draws on Hick's argument for the 
81 Heim, 215. 
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justification of religious beliefs. Heim notices that in Hick's argument for the 
rationality of religious beliefs that "it is only the current justification of belief which 
is unaffected by future falsification. Under some future conditions, such religious 
beliefs might no longer be justified. Hick however does not present his 
hypothesis as a belief justified pending circumstances which will decide its 
validity, but apparently as a belief justified under any set of future 
circumstances.,,82 
This critique is, of course, parallel to his first argument. In the first he 
argues that Hick's hypothesis does not have the potential to be verified, even 
eschatologically. Even on Hick's own terms, this would make his hypothesis 
meaningless. In the second argument, Heim contends that Hick's hypothesis 
does not have the potential to be falsified. Given that it can be neither verified or 
falsified, Hick's hypothesis is unworkable and empty. "In short, the pluralistic 
hypothesis is a religious claim which falls afoul of the charge of emptiness 
against which Hick has fought so valiantly to defend religious claims in 
general.,,83 
I contend that the critique given here by Heim poses a great challenge to 
the overall philosophy of John Hick. In chapter eleven of An Interpretation of 
Religion, Hick defends religious language against the charge of meaninglessness 
posed by the verificationist. If this chapter is viewed as being completely 
separate from the rest of the book, particularly the pluralistic hypothesis, then 
there is no real problem. The verificationists pose a challenge to religious 
82 Heim, 216. 
83 Heim, 218. 
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language, and Hick defends religious language against the challenge through his 
notion of eschatological verification. But Hick fails to realize that this exact same 
challenge can be addressed to the language of his pluralistic hypothesis and he 
will not be able to respond in the same way. 
Dr. Chester Gillis, in his article entitled "An Interpretation of An 
Interpretation of Religion", also focuses on Hick's appeal to verification ism as a 
point of critique. Unlike Heim, he does not notice how Hick's concession to 
verificationism could possibly be devastating to his hypothesis, but simply states 
that Hick should not appeal to this in his attempt to argue for religious 
meaningfulness. 
Hick's continued concern with empiricism, particularly the logical-positivist 
variety, seems to be a concession to the validity of the whole enterprise of 
logical-positivism. Most scholars have dismissed this long ago as ill-fated 
and unworthy of further consideration. The criteria of the logical positivists 
are simply not well founded or acceptable. To continue to try to answer 
the question of the referent of religion on the grounds established by 
logical positivism is to concede validity to those grounds.84 
Gillis' critique suggests a possible way for Hick to avoid the critique raised by 
Heim. If, as Gillis suggests, Hick could abandon concessions to logical 
positivism and verification ism and, instead, critique the entire enterprise, then 
perhaps, in so doing, he could support his claim to religious meaningfulness and 
at the same time avoid putting his entire hypothesis in jeopardy. But, judging 
from Hick's response to Gillis, in which he simply restates his argument given in 
his 1977 paper explained above, this seems to be a step he is unwilling to take. 
84 Charles Gillis, "An Interpretation of An Interpretation of Religion," Problems in the Philosophy of 
Religion, ed. Harold Hewitt,jr. (New York: St. Martin's, 1991) 37. 
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Another strong critique comes from Paul Eddy who charges Hick with 
offering a hyper-subjectivist model and that, in the end,this necessarily must 
lead him to a Feuerbachian non-realism. He notes that Hick wants to retain a 
realist core, i.e. the noumenal Real, but be able to explain at the same time the 
diversity of understandings of this Real. The key to this is his insistence of the 
ineffability of the noumenal Real. "In this manner, he offers a religious realist -
as opposed to a naturalistic - interpretation of religion, while at the same time 
allowing the subjectivist component to create the space for radically divergent 
human understandings of the divine reality."s5 
Eddy begins his critique by showing that Hick's attempt to ground the 
notion of divine ineffability in the various traditions is ultimately a failure because 
what Hick has in mind by the term 'ineffability' and what the thinkers of the 
various traditions, or at least Christianity, had in mind are quite different. Hick 
cites Augustine's declarative 'God transcends even the mind' and 8t. Thomas' 
'The first cause surpasses human understanding and speech' as instances of 
claims to divine ineffability in the Christian tradition. s6 Eddy claims that the 
religious thinkers' notion of divine infinity and ineffability suggest that ''the divine 
can never be exhaustively known. To admit that we can never know all of the 
divine is a far cry from claiming that we can never know anything of the divine."S? 
For Eddy, this ultra-subjectivist stance does serious damage to Hick's 
realist position. He cites Feuerbach's observation that: 
85 Paul R. Eddy, "Religious Pluralism and the Divine," Religious Studies 30 (1994): 468. 
86 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 238. 
87 Eddy, 471. 
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To deny all the qualities of a being is equivalent to denying the being 
himself ... The denial of determinate, positive predicates concerning the 
divine nature is nothing else than a denial of religion, with, however, an 
appearance of religion in its favor, so that it is not recognized as a denial; 
it is simply a subtle disguised atheism ... Dread of limitation is dread of 
existence.88 
Hick, however, does claim that while no substantial propositions can be applied 
to the noumenal Real, there are some purely formal and relational propositions 
that can be. "In this purely formal mode we can say of the postulated Real an 
sich that it is the noumenal ground of the encountered gods and experienced 
absolutes witnessed to by the religious traditions.,,89 Eddy notices though that 
Hick is bringing in substance in his claims about the Real an sich. ''To speak of 
purely formal properties is to speak solely in terms of relation, with absolutely no 
substantive content whatsoever. But clearly to say that X has the property of 
'being a referent of a term' does have some amount of substantive content. If 
nothing else, it reveals that X 'can be identified by some human language 
user,.,,90 For Eddy, all this shows the dilemma that Hick is in. "If, in reaction to 
Feuerbach's challenge, he allows for some sUbstantive knowledge of the Real, 
the heart of his pluralistic programme is betrayed. Thus, Hick is destined to walk 
that neo-Kantian no-man's land that lies somewhere in an imaginary space 
between religious realism and a thoroughly subjectivized anti-realism.,,91 
Hick directly responds to this critique in his article entitled "Religious 
Pluralism and the Divine: A Response to Paul Eddy". However, concerning 
! I 
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Eddy's application of Feuerbach's argument to the noumenal Real, Hick avoids 
the issue and simply states that: 
It is of course true that, as Eddy says, it is possible to regard the entire 
phenomenon of religious experience as being 'accounted for by those 
religious concepts and sentiments found in religio-cultural systems and/or 
in the individuals themselves', and thus fall in line with Feuerbach. But 
this consideration is double edged. For the naturalistic option can be 
invoked against non-pluralist as easily as against pluralist religious views. 
It is not an argument that an exclusivist believer in the reality of the Divine 
can use against a pluralist believer in the reality of the Divine.~2 
In a footnote, Hick informs the reader that it is obvious from other writings that 
Eddy is an exclusivist Christian. But Hick is failing to distinguish between the 
argument and the person arguing. The argument that Eddy offers in this 
particular critique still needs to be addressed by Hick, despite Eddy's views 
offered in other works. 
Moreover, the specific challenge of Feuerbach to which Eddy is pointing 
would only apply to those, like Hick, that maintain that God (or 'the Real') is 
completely unknowable. For Feuerbach, to posit the existence of an unknowable 
God is to posit "a merely negative existence, an existence without existence, a 
self-contradictory existence, - a state of being which, as to its effects, is not 
distinguishable from non-being.,,93 This critique would not apply to those who 
hold that certain positive predicates can be applied to God. In his response, Hick 
seems to say that he does not need to respond to this Feuerbachian challenge 
because Feuerbach, in other places, challenges the beliefs of Eddy. 
Feuerbach's position that an existing unknowable God is indistinguishable from 
92 John Hick, "Religious Pluralism and the Divine: A Response to Paul Eddy," Religious Studies 31 (1995): 
419. 
93 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (Buffalo: Prometheus, 1989) 15. 
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the non-existence of God is a challenge separate from his position that God is 
simply a human projection. 
While Eddy is astute in applying this critique to the philosophy of Hick, he 
surprisingly misses an even stronger Feuerbachian challenge that applies 
directly to Hick. While Feuerbach is critical of the position that God is completely 
unknowable, he is even more critical of distinguishing between God an sich and 
God as God appears to human consciousness. "But this distinction between 
what God is in himself, and what he is for me destroys the peace of religion, and 
is besides in itself an unfounded and untenable distinction. I cannot know 
whether God is something else in himself or for himself than he is for me; what 
he is to me is to me all that he is.,,94 To make the distinction between God an 
sich and God as he appears requires a transcendental point of view which is in 
actuality impossible. I can distinguish between an object as it is in itself and as it 
appears "only where an object can really appear otherwise to me, not where it 
appears to me such as the absolute measure of my nature determines it to 
appear - such as it must appear to me.,,95 
Feuerbach not only maintains the distinction that Hick is trying to make is 
untenable and unfounded, but also that it is essentially irreligious. 
To every religion the gods of otherreligions are only notions concerning 
God, but its own conception of God is to it God himself, the true God -
God as he is in himself. Religion is satisfied only with a complete Deity, a 
God without reservation; it will not have ?- mere phantasm of God; it 
demands God himself.96 I 
94 Feuerbach, 16. 
95 Feuerbach, 16. 
96 Feuerbach, 16-17. 
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This begins to raise the question of the practicality of Hick's hypothesis in the 
various religious traditions, a question which will be returned to later. 
In An Interpretation of Religion, Hick addresses the thought of Feuerbach 
and other philosophers who have offered positive, non-realist interpretations of 
religion. But he only critiques their non-realist application of religious language. 
He rejects the Feuerbachian trade of preserving a certain value of God-talk by 
showing that it refers to human ideals. While he critiques Feuerbach's positive 
work, he does not respond to Feuerbach's text that can easily be applied as a 






Before responding to John Hick's pluralistic hypothesis and the critiques 
presented, it will be helpful to begin by briefly restating the factors that have 
brought Hick to his position. As was shown through the dialogue with Alston, 
Hick places great importance on religious experience for establishing the 
rationality of religious beliefs for those that have religious experiences. It is, for 
Hick, the essential element in justifying religious beliefs, for "Persons, if such 
there be, who never experience religiously in any degree whatever cannot have 
the same justification for belief.,,97 
But Hick also distinguishes between the strong, vivid religious experiences 
of the mahatmas and the religious experiences of the ordinary believer. Given 
the intensity of the reported experiences of the mahatmas, it would actually be 
irrational for the mahatmas not to trust this experience.98 But it seems that the 
ordinary believer always has a choice to make. This choice lies in how to 
interpret the religiously ambiguous universe. "Religious belief does not properly 
depend upon inference from evidences discovered in nature ... but upon 
unconsciously interpreting the impacts of the environment in such a way that it is 
97 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 221. 
98 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 216. 
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consciously experienced as having the kind of meaning articulated in religious 
experience. In interpreting in this way the believer is making a basic cognitive 
choice ... ,,99 While I have trouble understanding exactly how something that 
occurs unconsciously (in this case the act of interpreting the universe) can be 
called a choice, it nevertheless seems that, according to Hick, the way one 
decides to interpret the world will affect the experience one has. These religious 
experiences, although maybe not vivid or even memorable, "[make] it both 
possible and reasonable to be so impressed by the reports of the mahatmas that 
one's own experiences are supported by their much more massive awareness of 
the transcendent.,,10o 
At this point, Hick and I are in broad agreement. I agree that experience 
plays a key role in the process of beliefs gaining the status of 'justified'. We all 
experience the external world and are thus justified in believing in its existence 
unless sufficient contrary evidence can be obtained. Likewise, those who 
experience life as being lived in the unseen presence of God or a transcendental 
Being are justified in believing in the existence of God unless sufficient contrary 
evidence can be obtained. I also am in agreement with his argument for the 
religious ambiguity of the universe; or in other words, I agree that sufficient 
contrary evidence concerning the existence of Brahman/God/Allah/etc. has not 
been (and possibly could not be) obtained. 
I I 
However, all this leads Hick to ask the following question: "If the different 
kinds of religious experience justify people in holding the incompatible sets of 
99 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion 210. 
100 Hick, An Interpretaion of Religion 223. 
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beliefs developed within the different traditions, has not our justification for 
religious belief thereby undermined itself? Does it not offer an equal justification 
for the acceptance of a number of mutually contradictory propositions?,,101 As we 
saw in the Alston debate, Hick argues that the notion of 'one, true religion' does 
undermine the justification of religious belief, hence the need for his pluralistic 
hypothesis. 
My critique of Hick will be two-fold. First, I will show that the argument 
Hick gives for the need of his pluralistic hypothesis rests on a false premise. 
Secondly, I will argue that even if I am wrong about this and the premise is true, 
then Hick will be forced to thoroughly change his entire hypothesis. Thus, I will 
argue that Hick either has to come up with a new argument for the need of his 
hypothesis or change the hypothesis itself. 
One reason for the invalidity of Hick's argument concerning the need for 
his hypothesis is that Hick does not properly distinguish between the concepts of 
justification and truth. In their debate, Hick critiqued Alston because Alston's 
proposition that 'it is rational to base beliefs on religious experience' and his 
assumption that 'there is at most one true religion' were contradictory because "if 
only one of the many belief-systems based upon religious experience can be 
true, it follows that religious experience generally produces false beliefs, and that 
it is thus a generally unreliable basis for belief formation.,,102 However, if there is 
only one true religion, then religious experience may generally produce false 
beliefs (for that matter, sense experience may generally produce false beliefs), 
101 Hick, An Intelpretation of Religion 228. 
102 Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion 26. 
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but it does not generally produce unjustified beliefs. Given that we are 
epistemically cut off from 'truth', it is only justification that concerns us when 
forming beliefs. 
A simplified version of Hick's argument for the need of his pluralistic 
hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
1) Person A is justified in holding the belief that there is a personal, loving 
God present in the world if this belief is based upon religious experience 
and there is no strong evidence to refute this belief. 
2) Likewise person B is justified in believing that that reality is non-dual if 
this belief is based upon religious experience and there is no strong 
evidence to refute this belief 
3) It seems, then, that A and B are both justified in believing contradictory 
things. 
4) Given (3), it is implausible that all religious experience is illusion except 
one's own. 
5) Hence the Pluralistic Hypothesis which explains how each of the major 
traditions, which each give evidence to show that they are valid responses 
to the Real via their moral fruits, are in equal relation to the Ultimate 
Reality.103 
However, it seems that step 4 is an unwarranted move. If A recognized that B is 
just as justified in believing something contradictory to what she is justified in 
believing, she would not have to rationally admit that it is implausible that B's 
contradictory beliefs do not correspond to reality. Keith Ward, in his article 
103 Keith Ward, "Truth and the Diversity of Religions," Religious Studies 26 (1990): 12. 
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entitled "Truth and Religious Diversity" also notices this when he write, "Hick has 
already argued that both atheists and theists can be rationally justified in 
adopting the views of the world they adopt, given the ambiguous nature of that 
world. But it does not follow that each must accept the other's view as equally 
true.,,104 
My point can be made clear by way of example from sense experience. If 
I look into the sky and see an object that appears to me to be a bird, then I am 
justified in believing that it is a bird provided there is not other evidence that 
strongly suggest that this is not the case. If my neighbor Julie looks up into the 
sky and observes the same object but it appears to her to be an airplane, she is 
justified in believing that it is an airplane providing that no countervailing 
evidence is available. If I notice that Julie is justified in believing that it is a plane, 
and if I also recognize that it cannot be both a bird and a plane, I do not have to 
admit that it is implausible that she is in some sense deluded. Actually, given my 
justification for believing that it is a bird I would be internally justified in believing 
that Julie is deluded. That is, given that I am 1) justified in believing that the 
object is a bird, and that I am 2) justified in believing that Julie is justified in 
believing that it is an airplane, I am therefore 3) justified in believing that Julie is 
deluded. 
However, this does not mean that Julie is in fact deluded, for the object 
I· . 
could be a plane and, thus, I would be the one who IS deluded. So, the fact that 
two people can be equally justified from the same type of experience in believing 
104 Ward, 12-13. 
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two contradictory propositions, does not require a belief that the two propositions 
are equally true. 
Perhaps Hick could counter Ward's point by pointing out that the atheist 
and the theist are not in the same relation to one another as the theist and the 
absolutist because the theist and the absolutist have the same type of 
experience (religious experience) whereas the theist forms certain beliefs on a 
type of experience that the atheist does not have. The question of reliability is 
not as prevalent concerning sense experience because there is generally broad 
agreement as to the nature of the experience. Great diversity of opinion does not 
occur with beliefs formed from sense experience, so questions of its reliability are 
not as acute as with religious experience. Hick may similarly counter my point by 
arguing that contradictory reports from sense experience are the exception rather 
than the rule so we do not have to view sense experience as an unreliable basis 
for belief formation, for it is at least possible that it generally produces true 
beliefs. However, religious experience does, as a rule, produce contradictory 
propositions, so it seems that it is impossible for religious experience to generally 
produce true beliefs, unless we understand this in another way, i.e. the pluralistic 
hypothesis. 
But Hick's argument for the need of his hypothesis faces further difficulties 
in that it rests upon a heavily implicit and questionable assumption. Hick adheres 
to an externalist/reliabilist theory of justification. "Most externalist theories of the 
adequacy of grounds can be represented as reliabilist theories of various kinds, 
the central idea of which (to put it now more carefully) is that grounds of a 
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particular belief are adequate if (and only if) the particular. .. process of belief 
formation belongs to a reliable kind ... A process is more reliable, the greater the 
proportion of true beliefs it produces.,,105 
Hick shows this to be his epistemological stance in the dialogue with 
Alston. He argues that if only one religion is true then religious experience is an 
unreliable basis for forming beliHfs. 106 This then leads him to the conclusion that 
the 'one true religion' belief is "fatal to Alston's thesis that it is ... rational to base 
beliefs on religious experience.,,107 For Hick, if there is at most only one true 
religion, then religious experience is an unreliable basis for belief formation. If 
religious experience is an unreliable basis for belief formation, then it cannot 
adequately justify religious beliefs. Note that Hick does not admit the first 
premise and, therefore, does not have to admit the conclusion. But he argues 
that since Alston does admit the first premise, he must admit the conclusions. 
But implicit in Hick's argument is the assumption that in order for a belief to be 
justified, it must be arrived at by means of a reliable (or truth conducive) basis. 
However, this assumption is questioned by more internalist theories of 
justification. Internalist theories espouse the idea that the justification of a belief 
is necessarily internal to the believer.108 "The internalist insists that it is only the 
subject's beliefs about whether a process is or is not reliable that are relevant to 
the justification of a resulting belief, whereas for the externalist it is only the fact 
I I 
lOS Richard Swinburn, Epistemic Justification (Oxford: Clarendon, 2001) 13. 
106 Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion 26. 
107 Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion 26. 
108 Swinburne, 9. 
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that the process is or is not reliable - whether or not the subject believes that -
that is relevant.,,109 
While it would be entirely outside the scope of this paper to try and settle 
the debate that continues betwElen externalistlreliabilist and internalist theories of 
justification in favor of the latter, I can at least point out some of the major 
objections to the former and show how this applies to Hick's episte~ological 
position.110 To begin with, it is important to note that "reliabilism does not require 
that the believer in question have any sort of cognitive access to the fact that the 
belief producing process is in this way reliable in order for his or her belief to be 
justified. All that matters for justification is that the process in question is in fact 
reliable,,111 independent of what the believer happens to think about the process. 
With this basic tenet in mind, consider a group of people who live in a 
world that is controlled by a malicious demon of the sort imagined by Descartes. 
This malicious demon controls all of the sensory and intuitive experiences of the 
people, causing them to believe that a material world much like the one we 
experience exists, when in fact no material exists. These people are just as 
rigorous in their science and philosophy as we are, yet they form the false belief 
that the external world that they experience exists and form many other false 
beliefs based upon the deceptive appearance. 
Intuitively, it seems that the people of this world are justified in believing in 
the beliefs at which they arrive. For "their epistemic situation may, from their own 
109 Swinburne, 21. 
110 I am entirely indebted to Laurence Bonjour's article "Internalism and Externalism," The Oxford 
Handbook of Epistemology, ed. Paul K. Moser (Oxford, New York: Oxford UP, 2002) 234-263, as the 
source of the objections to externalism. 
III Bonjour, 244-45. 
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subjective standpoints, well be entirely indiscernible from or even superior to our 
own, so that if we are confident that our own beliefs are frequently justified, we 
should seeming be equally confident that theirs are.,,112 But this is just what the 
reliabilist denies. In light of this example, it seems that if the reliabilist theory of 
justification is correct, it would be impossible to distinguish with certainty justified 
beliefs from unjustified beliefs. Moreover, it seems to me that any claim that a 
certain process is or is not reliable is itself a belief, which in order to be justified 
by the reliabilist standard must also be formed on the basis of a reliable process. 
Unless the reliabilists can provide an ultimate ground, this is the beginning of an 
infinite regress. Moreover, it is generally held that while externalist theories 
regarding knowledge are plausible, externalist theories regarding justification are 
much less so. ''The idea that knowledge is externally grounded and justification 
internally grounded would help to explain why reliability theories are ... as 
plausible as they are for knowledge, yet much less plausible for justification.,,113 
Still, the debate over externalism and internalism is one that continues 
today and there are also many objections to internalist theories of justification. 
But even if externalism and Hick's basic point concerning the need for his 
hypothesis are correct, then his hypothesis and even his entire definition of the 
problem are much too limited in scope. For if we think about religion as a 'family 
concept' so that it would include Marxism, Humanism, etc. then we would have to 
I I 
conclude that given the diversity of opinions that are based on experience, 
experience generally produces false beliefs unless we can come up with a 
112 Bonjour, 247. 
113 Robert Audi, Belief, Justification, and Knowledge (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1988) 115. 
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hypothesis that sees all these ideologies as equally true. For instance, as Hick 
notes, certain people interpret the world in a completely naturalistic way and thus 
form the belief that only material exists. They may also, based upon experiences 
of economic injustice and oppression, come to adhere to Marxism. Or, based on 
their interpretation of their experiences, people may come to be Humanists, 
extreme idealists, pantheists, etc. 
Taken to a more general level, Hick's own critique of Alston can be used 
against him. It is clear from his writings that Hick is a dualist and believes that 
materialism and idealism are false. However, Hick also maintains that given the 
ambiguous nature of the universe others can justifiably believe in materialism or 
idealism if these beliefs are based on experience. But Hick's assumption that 
only one of these can be correct is fatal to his empiricist position that it is rational 
to base beliefs on experience. For if only one of these can be true it follows that 
experience generally produces false beliefs, and that it is an unreliable basis for 
belief formation. 114 Hick focuses our attention on transcendental religions and 
then gives his argument that there is a problem of religious diversity that needs to 
be addressed. However, if this is in fact a problem it is much wider than religious 
diversity and is rather a problem of world-view diversity. 
Keith Ward, in his critique of Hick, also notices something similar, but does 
not focus upon it to question whether there is in fact a problem of religious 
diversity. He states that: 
"What [Hick] is doing is to pick out one class of religious beliefs, or one set 
of religious phenomena which can be defined in terms of belief in a 
transcendent salvific reality. There is nothing wrong with that; but it should 
114 See Hick's parallel argument in Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, 26. 
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be noted that it picks out one area of agreement in truth-claims by 
definition. Faiths which lack that central belief are not going to be 
counted; conversely, faiths which are counted are assured a minimal 
degree of agreement to begin with ... But, so far, this is not really 
pluralism (the acceptance of very different beliefs as equally valid); it is 
exclusivism at a relatively abstract and general level (those are excluded 
who do not believe in one transcendent salvific reality).115 . 
But when this observation is made in conjunction with the argument Hick gives 
for the need for his hypothesis, there does seem to be something wrong with 
focusing attention on one type of religious belief, for it presents the alleged 
problem to be much simpler than it actually is. 
Thus, if Hick wants to continue to maintain that the argument he gives for 
the need of his hypothesis is correct, then he needs to change his entire 
hypothesis because it is much too limited in scope. His hypothesis would have to 
explain how all or most rational world views can be viewed as being equally true 
despite their differences, not just how all of the major post-axial religious faiths 
can be seen as equally true. Conversely, if Hick wants to preserve his 
hypothesis the way it is, he needs to give a different argument for the need of the 
hypothesis. He needs to argue for what he simply assumes in the dialogue with 
Alston, namely externalism/reliabilism; but at the same time argue that this 
epistemological position somehow only applies to the beliefs of the religions he is 
considering at not to beliefs in general. For if externalism/reliabilism holds for all 
beliefs, then, given the diversity and mutual incompatibility of beliefs based on 
experience in general, experience cannot be a reliable method in justifying 
beliefs. 
lIS Ward, 3. 
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In the absence of any new argument for the need of his hypothesis, I will 
now argue for what I think does follow from Hick's observation that people can be 
equally justified in believing contradictory religious propositions. If I recognize 
that other people are equally justified in believing religious propositions that are 
contradictory to my own, it seems that I must admit that my own religious views 
are fallible and uncertain. This observation does not need to force me to 
religious skepticism, for "just because it is possible for me to go wrong, it does 
not follow that I can never go right.,,116 And while the position of religious 
falliblism hedges those who hold it from religious skepticism on the one end, it 
has the added advantage of hedging those who hold it from religious dogmatism 
on the other. For while religious falliblism requires the observation that I could be 
wrong, it also requires the observation that people from traditions different from 
my own could be right in many important respects. Thus, it keeps my religious 
beliefs open to constant revision. Moreover, on this observation, my proposal of 
religious falliblism seems to be a "moderate, rational, balanced, Anglican-style 
middle way,,117 of the kind of which Hick is so fond. 
Hick seems to be concerned with opening up space for religious dialogue 
and is interested to "move beyond the static situation of rival absolutisms.,,118 But 
if this is a driving force for Hick in the creation of his hypothesis, then one should 
notice that religious falliblism offers an alternative to Hick's way of accomplishing 
this goal. For if I recognize that I could be wrong and others could be right, it 
116 Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 
1996) 140. 
ll7 Hick, "Religious Pluralism and the Divine: A Response to Paul Eddy" 420. 
liS Hick, Disputed Questions in Theology and the Philosophy of Religion 154. 
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becomes advantageous for me to listen to those with opposing religious views. 
And while it would not be rational for me to accept religious propositions that 
completely clash with my experience, I am kept safe from the 'static situation' 
Hick mentions because religious fallibilism keeps my religious beliefs open to 
constant revision. Moreover, Hick's pluralistic hypothesis has just as much 
potential to be held dogmatically as any other religious system. 
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Conclusion 
Throughout this study of John Hick and religious pluralism, it has been 
shown how Hick's insistence on the importance of religious experience in 
justifying religious beliefs leads him to argue that there is a problem of religious 
diversity that can only be successfully solved by his pluralistic hypothesis. The 
two issues of the rationality of religious beliefs and religious pluralism are for Hick 
inextricably linked, for the way he argues for the rationality of religious beliefs 
pushes him to his religious pluralism. However, I have argued that one can 
agree with the way Hick argues for the rationality of religious belief without 
maintaining that there is a need for a pluralistic hypothesis. This can be done by 
adopting an internalist theory of justification and by always keeping the distinction 
between justification and truth sharp. In so doing, we do not have to follow Hick 
down the road that Heim, Eddy, Feurerbach and others have shown is so riddled 
with problems; but we must adopt an attitude of religious falliblism. By doing this 
we avoid the extremes of skepticism and dogmatism and keep the line of 
religious communication open. Moreover, we preserve an attitude of humility that 
I ' 
is advocated by all of the great religious traditions. 
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